



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

B9

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536



FILE:




Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: OCT 3 2000


EAC 99 228 52211

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:



APPLICATION: Petition for Special Immigrant Battered Spouse Pursuant to Section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:



Public Copy

Identifying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

Terrance M. O'Reilly, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a native and citizen of Italy who is seeking classification as a special immigrant pursuant to section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), as the battered spouse of a United States citizen.

The director determined that the petitioner failed to establish that she is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to herself, or to her child. The director, therefore, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the director failed to properly identify and assess the potential extreme hardship which the petitioner will suffer when returned to her country of origin. She further asserts that the director failed to give the proper weight to the evidence presented by the petitioner, more specifically, to the psychological evaluation and findings that the petitioner would indeed suffer extreme hardship if returned to Italy. While counsel states that she is sending a brief and/or additional evidence within 30 days, it has been over four months since the filing of the appeal in this matter, and neither a brief nor additional evidence has been received in the record of proceeding.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1) states, in pertinent part, that:

(i) A spouse may file a self-petition under section 204(a)(1)(A)(iii) or 204(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Act for his or her classification as an immigrant relative or as a preference immigrant if he or she:

(A) Is the spouse of a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the United States;

(B) Is eligible for immigrant classification under section 201(b)(2)(A)(i) or 203(a)(2)(A) of the Act based on that relationship;

(C) Is residing in the United States;

(D) Has resided in the United States with the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse;

(E) Has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage; or is the parent of a child who

has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, the citizen or lawful permanent resident during the marriage;

(F) Is a person of good moral character;

(G) Is a person whose deportation (removal) would result in extreme hardship to himself, herself, or his or her child; and

(H) Entered into the marriage to the citizen or lawful permanent resident in good faith.

The petition, Form I-360, shows that the petitioner arrived in the United States on July 16, 1996. The petitioner married her United States citizen spouse on March 27, 1997 at Coral Gables, Florida. On July 25, 1999, a self-petition was filed by the petitioner claiming eligibility as a special immigrant alien who has been battered by, or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by, her U.S. citizen spouse during their marriage.

8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(G) requires the petitioner to establish that her removal would result in extreme hardship to herself or to her child. 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(viii) provides:

The Service will consider all credible evidence of extreme hardship submitted with a self-petition, including evidence of hardship arising from circumstances surrounding the abuse. The extreme hardship claim will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis after a review of the evidence in the case. Self-petitioners are encouraged to cite and document all applicable factors, since there is no guarantee that a particular reason or reasons will result in a finding that deportation (removal) would cause extreme hardship. Hardship to persons other than the self-petitioner or the self-petitioner's child cannot be considered in determining whether a self-petitioning spouse's deportation (removal) would cause extreme hardship.

The director, in his decision, reviewed and discussed the evidence furnished by the petitioner, including evidence furnished in response to his request for additional evidence on August 13, 1999, and on January 13, 2000. He noted that the petitioner furnished a statement indicating that divorce is not very common in Italy, and that in Italy there is a stigma attached to being a divorced woman. He further noted that the Psychological Evaluation Report, furnished by the petitioner, indicates that the petitioner is from a small town in Italy, and that she is suffering from depression. The director determined that the evidence furnished by the

petitioner did not establish that she would suffer extreme hardship if removed to Italy because: (1) divorce is "not very common" in Italy; (2) she would be ostracized because she would be a divorced woman living in Italy; and (3) she would be unable to receive treatment or therapy in Italy, and that it would seem that a country such as Italy would have many opportunities for psychological treatment and counseling.

Counsel, on appeal, argues that the director failed to properly identify and assess the potential extreme hardship which the petitioner will suffer when returned Italy, and that he also failed to give the proper weigh to the psychological evaluation and findings that the petitioner would indeed suffer extreme hardship if returned to Italy. However, as provided in 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(viii), the extreme hardship claim was evaluated by the director after a review of the evidence in this matter. The director determined that the record did not contain satisfactory evidence to establish that the petitioner's removal would result in extreme hardship. Counsel, however, did not refute the director's findings on appeal.

The record lists no other equities which might weigh in the petitioner's favor. Even applying a flexible approach to extreme hardship, the facts presented in this proceeding, when weighed in the aggregate, do not demonstrate that the petitioner's removal would result in extreme hardship to herself.

The petitioner has failed to overcome the director's finding pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(i)(G).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.